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Party Not Otherwise a Federal-Court Defendant
May Not Be a 'Pendent Party' in a § 1983 Claim

In Aldinger v. Howard,I the U.S. Supreme Court held that a party not
already in federal court under a federal claim may not be brought into
federal court under a state claim, even though the plaintiff's state claim
has a "common nucleus of operative fact" with the plaintiff's federal claim
against another party. This limitation on "pendant party" jurisdiction,
however, was restricted to state claims asserted to be "pendent" to 42
U.S.C.A. § 19832 and its jurisdictional corollary, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3).3
Petitioner Aldinger had a civil-rights claim under § 1983 against Respondent Howard, the treasurer of Spokane County, who had fired Aldinger for
"living with [her] boy friend." 4 She also sued the county itself, not under
§ 1983, which she admitted did not apply to governments, but under a
state law. Aldinger contended that the U.S. District Court had pendent
jurisdiction over her state claim against the county, because that claim
and her § 1983 claim against Howard had a "common nucleus of operative
fact." '5 The district judge dismissed the action against the county, since the
county was not a "person" under § 1983 and since there was no other
independent basis of federal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed
1. U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1974) reads: "Every person, who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1976) reads in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person. . . (3) To redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of any citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
4. The Washington state statute allowed a county officer to "revoke each appointment
at pleasure." WASH. REv. CODE § 36.16.070 (1973). Aldinger might have brought Spokane
County into federal court under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 by alleging arbitrary or discriminatory
actions and denial of a hearing, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and avoided the
pendent-party problem altogether. Aldinger apparently did not press the argument in the
lower courts, and the Supreme Court said that possibility was "not before us." 96 S. Ct. at
2415-2416 n. 3.
5. The language is from the test established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715 (1966), discussed below.
6. 513 F.2d 1257 (1975). That decision was based on Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
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The concept of "pendent party" jurisdiction, on which Aldinger based
her jurisdiction argument, is in part the product of merging the principles
underlying pendent jurisdiction and those underlying ancillary jurisdiction.! Under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, a federal court, once it
has subject jurisdiction, may decide non-federal issues if a forum is needed
to protect parties whose interests will be affected by the decision.' The
Supreme Court expanded the doctrine in Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange' when it held that federal courts have the power to decide a
compulsory counterclaim because by definition it arises out of the same
transaction as the plaintiffs federal claim. The doctrine normally is used
to carry out the liberal provisions for joinder of claims and joinder of
parties under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.10 Pendent jurisdiction
allows a plaintiff to tack state claims onto a federal claim and have the
federal court resolve all the issues." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 2 upon
which the Court in Aldinger relied heavily, established the criteria for
pendent jurisdiction when the Court said the federal and non-federal
claims must be based on a common nucleus of operative fact before a
defendant already in federal court can be compelled to answer non-federal
3
claims.
Both federal courts and commentators are divided over the question
whether the "common nucleus" may be the basis for including as a party
one over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists." The authorities
favoring this "pendent party" jurisdiction contend that such an expansion
of federal jurisdiction over claims and parties is both logical and practical
in light of Gibbs;5 it would produce fairer, more realistic and more economical decisions, 6 and is warranted by the expansion, through the Fed7. See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, Towards a Synthesis of Two
Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263 (1975).
8. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (2d ed. 1970). The doctrine is based on
Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860), and Fulton Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276
(1925). See also Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885), and Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v.
Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
9. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
10. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9 (2d ed. 1970).
11. The leading case is Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737
(1824).
12. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
13. Id. at 725.
14. See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, Towards a Synthesis of Two
Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263 (1975); Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 372 F. Supp.
686 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also: Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and
Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 759 (1972).
15. These proponents urge that Gibbs be read as emphasizing the broadened use of pendent jurisdiction and should not be limited to its facts. See Comment, Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction, Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 1279.
16. These are the basic considerations in exercising pendent jurisdiction as set forth in
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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eral Rules, of the types of claims and parties that may be joined in federal
court. The authorities opposing pendent-party jurisdiction argue that the
doctrine is not consistent with Gibbs and is an illogical extension of jurisdictional power granted federal courts in article Ill, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution.
Before Gibbs, the Supreme Court in Hurn v. Oursler" held that the
federal courts have jurisdiction to decide a state claim along with a federal
copyright-infringement claim because the claims were "two distinct
grounds in support of a single cause of action."'" The Court said the two
claims rested on identical facts and therefore were "little more than the
equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circum-z
stances."' 9 Gibbs contained "two separate and distinct causes of action,"
but the Court still allowed pendent jurisdiction. It rejected the Hum
"cause of action" approach and adopted a more flexible approach.
In Gibbs, the respondent sued the United Mine Workers union under
both a federal statute and state common law. Both claims arose out of the
alleged employment and contractual relations with the owner of a coal
mine. Although diversity was absent, the Court held that Gibbs could
assert his state claims as well as his federal claims against the petitioner
under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. The Court said that the power
to hear the case existed when the federal claim was of sufficient substance
and the state claim was derived from a common nucleus of operative fact
in such'2 a manner that the entire action comprised but one constitutional
"case." ' The Court said, however, that judges may use their discretion in
exercising pendent jurisdiction by considering "judicial economy, conveni212
ence and fairness to litigants.
In A ldinger, the Supreme Court held that pendent-party jurisdiction
over a non-federal defendant on a state-law claim depends on the jurisdictional statute on which the plaintiff's federal claim is based.2 3 A federal
17.
18.

289 U.S. 238 (1933).
289 U.S. at 246, quoted at 96 S. Ct. at 2417.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, n. 12. "One constitutional 'case'" refers to jurisdiction only,
and for this purpose the federal or state character of the plaintiff's claim may be ignored.
That principle is based on Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824),
in which Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "[Wihen a question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in
the power of congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other
questions of fact or law may be involved in it." 22 U.S. at 823. Although Congress may not
grant federal courts more power than article III of the Constitution allows, article 1IIrefers
to "cases." Federal courts therefore are not limited to the "federal question" raised in a case;
they may decide state claims necessary to the resolution of a plaintiff's federal claim.
22. Id. at 726. The court also said that in deciding the question of discretion, pendent
jurisdiction might be particularly applicable if the state claim is closely tied to questions of
federal policy. Id. at 727.
23. 96 S. Ct. at 2421.
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court must determine whether Congress intended to grant pendent-party
jurisdiction as an attachment to the particular type of federal claim. Congress had excluded counties from federal jurisdiction in § 1983 claims, the
Court said, so a federal court could not logically apply pendent jurisdiction
to bring the county back within federal jurisdiction.
The Court found it unnecessary to formulate any general jurisdictional
rule. It instead considered whether the rationale of Gibbs could be extended to pendent-party jurisdiction. The Court determined in Gibbs that
Congress had said nothing about the scope of the word "cases" in article
III that would serve as a guide to whether a federal court could hear a
parallel non-federal claim against a defendant already properly in federal
court. Since Congress had not acted, the courts were free to fashion their
own rule allowing such claims, according to the Gibbs analysis. The Court
in Aldinger, however, found that including a new defendant without an
independent basis of federal jurisdiction would run counter to the principle
that federal courts have limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress. Before such a party could be joined, the federal court must determine that
Congress had not expressly or implicitly prohibited such jurisdiction
against that party.
The Court distinguished Gibbs on the basis of statutory jurisdictional
considerations in holding that pendent-party jurisdiction does not confer
federal jurisdiction over a county to answer a § 1983 claim. In Gibbs, the
5
4
Court rejected the "unnecessarily grudging" approach to parallel claims2
in Hurn and developed clear guidelines for the application of pendent
jurisdiction in the federal courts. In Aldinger, however, the Court established for pendent-party jurisdiction what amounted to little more than a
nebulous standard."6 The Court explicitly refrained from resolving the confusion about the applicability of pendent-party jurisdiction and instead
required a subjective analysis of congressional intent before a defendant
who is not otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction may be reached by
pendent-party jurisdiction.Y
The Court could have been saying that pendent-party jurisdiction may
not be used to reach a type of defendant excluded from the substantive
federal claim to which the state-claim jurisdiction would be attached. In
Aldinger's case, § 1983 creates a claim against a "person," not a government, so a government, under this reading of Aldinger, cannot be reached
24. 383 U.S. at 725.
25. A federal claim and a state claim asserted against the same defendant are said to be
"parallel."
26. See 96 S. Ct. at 2424 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, argues that all cases in which pendent-party jurisdiction
is asserted will, by definition, refer to a party about which Congress has impliedly addressed
itself by not expressly granting jurisdiction over that party.
27. The Court in Gibbs said nothing of this congressional-intent analysis; it considered
the limits of article III.
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as a pendent party. If that was indeed the holding, the Court muddled it
by limiting it to § 1983. The Court should have been more attentive to the
thought behind Gibbs and the Marshall-era case, Osborn v. Bank of the
United States:" article III allows federal jurisdiction over "cases," not
merely federal issues, and a federal court has the power to decide all issues,
including state issues, in those "cases."
GARY D. SIMPSON
28.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737 (1824).

